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CLASS ACTIONS: THE LIMITS 
OF FORUM SELECTION BYLAWS 
PAUL SCHOCHET†  
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2018, The Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust 
offered a shareholder proposal1 “to adopt a mandatory arbitration 
bylaw” in Johnson & Johnson’s annual proxy2 statement.3  Led by 
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review and Journal of Catholic Legal 
Studies; J.D. Candidate 2021, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, 
University of Delaware. I thank my Note advisor, Dean Michael A. Perino, for his 
invaluable insight and guidance. I am also grateful to my father, Ira A. Schochet, for 
inspiring this Note topic and for his thoughtful comments. 
1 The proposal states, in part: 
The shareholders of [Johnson & Johnson] request the Board of Directors take 
all practicable steps to adopt a mandatory arbitration bylaw that provides: 
for disputes between a stockholder and the Corporation and/or its 
directors, officers or controlling persons relating to claims under federal 
securities laws in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities 
issued by the Corporation to be exclusively and finally settled by 
arbitration under the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), as supplemented by the Securities Arbitration 
Supplementary Procedures. 
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19-8828, 2019 WL 
1519026, at *1 & n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2019) (quoting the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable 
Trust’s proxy proposal). 
2 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Johnson & Johnson’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 7, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 19-8828) 
[hereinafter Brief for Defendant]. A Proxy statement is a required Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) document provided by the corporation to its 
shareholders that contains information concerning “voting procedure, nominated 
candidates for its board of directors, and compensation of directors and executives.” 
Alicia Tuovila, Proxy Statement, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms 
/p/proxystatement.asp [https://perma.cc/YH7V-FPR9] (last updated Oct. 30, 2020). 
This document is meant to ensure shareholders are up to date with all germane 
information heading into an annual or special stockholder meeting. Id.  
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(g) (2020). A corporation must include a shareholder 
proposal in its proxy statement unless the corporation can identify a procedural or 
substantive exception. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 
335–36 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8). 
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Professor Hal Scott,4 the shareholder’s proposal would ban class 
action shareholder disputes and require investors to resolve 
federal securities disputes through arbitration.5 
Predictably, the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust proxy 
proposal set off a flurry of legal actions.  Johnson & Johnson first 
proposed to exclude the proposal from its proxy materials, and 
sought no-action letter to that end from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), claiming that, if implemented, the 
arbitration bylaw would require the Company to violate state law.6  
In February 2019, the staff of the SEC agreed with Johnson & 
Johnson and issued the requested no-action letter7 based on New 
Jersey state law.  The staff’s decision, however, did not end the 
matter.  The same shareholder filed an action in federal court in 
New Jersey8 seeking to enjoin Johnson & Johnson’s April 25 
annual meeting because, according to the complaint, the Company 
improperly excluded its proposal.9  The New Jersey District Court 
denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.10  Later, in 
June 2021, the district court granted Johnson & Johnson’s motion 
to dismiss on mootness and ripeness grounds.11 
 
4 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Proposed Intervenors 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System and Colorado Public Employees’ 
Retirement Ass’n at 5, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 19-
8828).  
5 See Complaint at 4, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 19-
8828). 
6 Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 8. Johnson & Johnson benefited from an 
unsolicited letter from the New Jersey Attorney General stating that the arbitration 
bylaw would violate state law. Id. at 1–2. 
7 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2018 WL 
6584469 (Feb. 11, 2019). Subsequently, Johnson & Johnson filed its proxy material 
without the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust’s proposal under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(2), 
which permits the exclusion of proposals that would violate either state or federal law. 
See Brief for Defendant, supra note 2, at 2. 
8 See Complaint, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026 (No. 19-
8828).  
9 See Alison Frankel, Shareholder Pushing for Mandatory Arbitration Seeks To 
Block J&J’s Annual Meeting, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-otc-j-j/shareholder-pushing-for-mandatory-arbitration-seeks-to-block-
jjs-annual-meeting-idUSKCN1R82DD [https://perma.cc/J6UT-TT3X]. 
10 Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr., 2019 WL 1519026, at *5. 
11 Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19-8828, 2019 WL 
2722569, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021) (finding that The Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable 
Trust’s claim is moot because “it seeks a declaration regarding past conduct”); id. at 
*4 (“[T]he Court agrees that Plaintiffs’ request is not ripe because any controversy 
with respect to a proposal that the Trust might submit in connection with future 
shareholder meetings is hypothetical at this juncture and contingent on future 
events. . . .”). 
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While the Doris Behr Irrevocable Trust’s arbitration proposal 
is uncommon, it is not new.  For instance, in 2012, shareholders of 
Gannett and Pfizer sought to include an arbitration bylaw in each 
company’s respective proxy materials, but the SEC permitted both 
companies to exclude the proposal12 because, according to the SEC, 
it would violate federal law.13  Unlike the Johnson & Johnson 
proposal, which narrowly covered “claims under federal securities 
laws,”14 the proposal from both the Gannett and Pfizer share-
holders used more capacious language to cover “[a]ny controversy 
or claim brought directly or derivatively.”15  More recently, the 
trustee of CommonWealth REIT adopted a comparably broad 
arbitration bylaw, which covered all shareholder disputes.16   
The dispute over the Johnson & Johnson arbitration provision 
is part of a larger debate over the enforceability of arbitration 
bylaws.  Starting with CommonWealth REIT, litigation about at-
tempts to add arbitration bylaws has begun to permeate state and 
federal courts.  In these prior cases, courts found the arbitration 
bylaws adopted by the subject corporations enforceable by relying 
on recent pro-arbitration United States Supreme Court 
decisions.17  Yet these courts devoted little to no analysis to wheth-
er state law permitted adopting such bylaws.18  Outside the court-
room, scholars have also debated for years whether corporations 
may add mandatory arbitration clauses to bylaws for securities 
transactions.19  As with the judicial opinions, the bulk of the 
 
12 See Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859124 (Feb. 22, 
2012); Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
13 Opponents of arbitration bylaws have argued that such proposals are 
unenforceable under both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act anti-
waiver provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (2018); see also Letter from James 
Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of L., to Mary Jo White, Chair, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 30, 2013) (on file with Duke University). While these 
Securities Acts-based claims are relevant to this Note’s subject matter, they are not 
discussed. 
14 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
15 Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 12. 
16 See Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL 
1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013). 
17 See, e.g., id.; Katz v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, slip op. at 21–
22, 39–41 (Cir. Ct. Balt. Feb. 19, 2014); see also Delaware Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. 
Portnoy, No. 13-10405, 2014 WL 1271528, at *16 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (denying 
plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction on defendant’s 
arbitration bylaw). 
18 See cases cited supra note 17. 
19 See generally Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder 
Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751 (2015); Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities 
Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802; Bradley J. 
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analysis, and thus disagreement, amongst these scholars 
concerned the application of the Federal Arbitration Act to 
corporate governance documents.20   
This Note argues that bylaws providing for mandatory 
arbitration of federal securities law disputes are unenforceable 
under state corporate law.  First, to be enforceable, bylaws must, 
traditionally, involve the corporation’s internal affairs,21 a choice 
of law principle, which in this case limits the control that the cor-
poration can exercise over one of its key constituents—the share-
holders.  And treating issues concerning federal securities laws as 
“internal affairs” is a dubious proposition.  Such laws are only 
concerned with individual transactions involving purchases or 
sales of the corporation’s securities rather than the internal 
workings of the transacting corporation.  Second, long-standing 
court precedent has either explicitly held that securities trans-
actions do not affect a corporation’s internal affairs, or that claims 
only tangentially related to the internal workings of a corporation 
are not governed by the internal affairs doctrine.  Thus, such prec-
edent militates towards the unenforceability of arbitration bylaws 
seeking to regulate federal securities transactions.22 
Part I discusses why the mechanics of corporate class actions 
matter a great deal to corporations, shareholders, and academics.  
Part I also details both public and private strategies that oppo-
nents of securities class actions have taken to stymie such litiga-
tion.  Part II examines the competing arguments about whether 
 
Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform of 
the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to 
Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607 (2010); Zachary D. Clopton & Verity 
Winship, A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder Arbitration, 128 YALE 
L.J.F. 169 (2018); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration 
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583 (2016); Hal S. Scott & 
Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for 
Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187 (2013); Paul Weitzel, The End 
of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders To Customize Enforcement Through 
Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. REV. 65. 
20 See generally, e.g., Allen, supra note 19; Lipton, supra note 19.  
21 Cf. Boilermakers Loc. 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. 
Ch. 2013) (explaining how bylaws are impermissible under Delaware law if they 
regulate matters external to the function of a business, in contrast to bylaws covering 
only internal affairs). As explained infra notes 126–152 and accompanying text, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has recently broken from this consensus. At the time of this 
Note, however, this decision stands as a glaring outlier. 
22 While a court would need to address the preemptive effect of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, this Note only examines the reach of the internal affairs doctrine. For 
a detailed discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act’s applicability to corporate bylaws, 
see Lipton, supra note 19. 
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federal securities transactions are part of the internal affairs of a 
corporation.23 
While there has been a shift among corporations to address 
litigation threats through private ordering, and the Delaware 
Chancery has mainly ratified these different private actions as 
consistent with the internal affairs doctrine, courts must eventual-
ly draw a line.  Otherwise, courts risk the neutering of established 
doctrine that the incorporating state’s law governs matters con-
cerning a corporation’s internal affairs.  To that end, whether a 
claim implicates a corporation’s internal affairs, special attention 
must be paid to what relation the parties have to the corporation, 
what act gives rise to the cause of action, and what source of law 
the claim turns on. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Types of Claims and Size of Dispute 
Federal securities class action claims come in several itera-
tions.  But some of the most common ones involve either fraud in 
a public securities offering under the Securities Act of 193324 or 
violations of Rule 10b-525 promulgated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193426 for cases of fraud after the issuance of stock.27  
These causes of action allow shareholders to act as a “private 
attorney general”—enforcing federal law without relying on the 
SEC or Department of Justice to take action first.28 
 
23 Although the Johnson & Johnson litigation illustrates that corporate law can 
be challenged in all fifty states, this Note will focus primarily on Delaware law because 
of the special place that state holds in the United States for corporate governance. See 
Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing 
Delaware law “because of Delaware’s position as a leader in the field of corporate law” 
and noting that the “courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law”). These 
court decisions, and others like it, are unsurprising as sixty percent of publicly traded 
companies are incorporated in Delaware. See Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns, 
The Delaware Delusion, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 3, 2015), https://clsbluesky 
.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/03/the-delaware-delusion/ [https://perma.cc/LY4U-9TH4]. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2018). 
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
27 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence 
from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 497–
98 (2007); Weitzel, supra note 19, at 72. 
28 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983); see also 
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 913, 918 & n.17 (citing Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)). 
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Federal securities claims make up a significant proportion of 
class actions in federal court.  To take one study as an example, 
between 2004 and 2005 shareholder securities suits made up forty-
eight percent of all class actions pending in federal court.29   
In addition, these suits involve a significant amount of po-
tential monetary recovery.  For instance, from 2005 to 2010 there 
were around 100 securities class actions in each of those years in 
federal court that ended in a settlement.30  Of these roughly 100 
suits a year, their aggregate settlements ranged from $7 billion to 
$17 billion per year.31   
Further, while certain parties have called for the elimination 
of the practice area writ large,32 these suits have remained preva-
lent throughout the industry.  As of 2018, the securities industry 
“saw more companies on [United States] exchanges facing a 
greater threat of securities litigation than in any previous year.”33  
Even more notable—and surprising considering actions by legis-
latures and courts to limit securities class action suits34—is that 
the 403 newly filed securities class action suits in 2018 “nearly 
double[d] the 1997–2017 [filing] average.”35 
B. Opponents 
Although securities class action suits have many defenders,36 
such suits do not lack critics.  For one, these opponents assert that 
such suits are an ineffective way to deter future malfeasance or to 
 
29 Weitzel, supra note 19, at 78.  
30 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their 
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 814 (2010). 
31 Id.  
32 See, e.g., Hal Scott, The SEC’S Misguided Attack on Shareholder Arbitration, 
WALL ST. J.: OPINION (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secs-
misguided-attack-on-shareholder-arbitration-11550794645 [https://perma.cc/KFM2-
KZQG]. 
33 Alexander Aganin & John Gould, Securities Class Action Filings—2018 Year in 
Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 8, 2019), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2019/02/08/securities-class-action-filings-2018-year-in-review/ [https:// 
perma.cc/87ZG-DQDR].  
34 See Weitzel, supra note 19, at 80 (discussing the “heighten[ed] pleading require-
ments, expand[ed] safe harbors, limit[ations] [on] who can sue, cap[ped] damage 
amounts, [and] delay[ed] discovery” measures that legislatures have instituted to cut 
back on class action securities litigation). 
35 Aganin & Gould, supra note 33.  
36 See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown, 114 
W. VA. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem 
in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 336; James D. Cox, Making 
Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 499 (1997). 
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compensate shareholders harmed by fraud because the remedy for 
securities class action suits is, they claim, “pocket-shifting wealth 
transfers” among shareholders.37  Put differently, when a share-
holder class action suit settles, the money the shareholders receive 
comes from the company, which ultimately comes from the 
shareholders.38  Another critique lodged at shareholder class ac-
tion suits involves the costs, both in the billions paid to defense 
attorneys39 and in “distract[ing] directors” from core business 
decisions.40  Finally, opponents of securities class action suits seek 
to tar the whole enterprise as a plaintiff attorney money-making 
machine.41   
Indeed, these opponents have not sat idly by,42 but have de-
ployed several strategies over the years to try to impede federal 
securities class actions.  First, these individuals turned to the 
courts.  For instance, in a series of recent decisions, the Supreme 
Court has held that liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 did not extend to “aiders and abettors”43 and limited liability 
for individuals participating in a fraudulent scheme.44   
Second, opponents of securities class actions have simulta-
neously turned to legislatures for redress.  And Congress, in par-
ticular, has answered that call.  Beginning in 1995 with the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
 
37 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1583 (2006). 
38 This “circularity argument” is one of the most contentious critiques of securities 
shareholder class actions, and proponents of such suits vociferously contest the point. 
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on 
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
243, 244–45; Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers 
Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 303. 
39 See Andrew J. Pincus, What’s Wrong with Securities Class Action Lawsuits? 3 
(Feb. 5, 2014) (unpublished report) (on file with the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Securities_Class 
_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDV5-KPCT]. 
40 Garry D. Hartlieb, Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses for 
Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 131, 
131 (2014). 
41 See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891–92 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(opining that class action shareholder actions “too often . . . serve[ ] only to generate 
fees for certain lawyers”); Scott, supra note 33. 
42 See Black, supra note 19, at 803 (“The attacks on the securities fraud class 
action never end.”). 
43 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 188 (1994). 
44 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–67 
(2008). 
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(“PSLRA”),45 Congress has capped damages,46 excluded discovery 
before determinations on motions to dismiss,47 and restricted 
access to state court for federal securities claims.48  However, 
because of the mixed results from these efforts,49 the discussion 
has turned to new strategies to eliminate such suits.  Rather than 
relying on courts or Congress, opponents of securities class actions 
have now focused their efforts on private ordering.50 
C. New Strategies 
Of these private efforts, regulating litigation concerning the 
internal workings of a corporation has gained prominence among 
opponents of securities class actions.  One such strategy practiced 
throughout the industry has been adding a forum selection by-
law.51  A bylaw is an “administrative provision adopted by an 
organization,” generally a corporation, that controls its internal 
governance.52  In Delaware, the authority to adopt, repeal, or 
amend bylaws “shall be[long to] the stockholders”; however, stock-
holders may “confer th[is] power . . . upon the directors.”53  Fur-
ther, a bylaw may not be “inconsistent with law or with the 
certificate of incorporation.”54   
In contrast, a forum selection clause concerns litigating 
disputes.  Specifically, such a clause is a “contractual provision” 
designating an agreed-upon location—such as a country, state, or 
 
45 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737. PSLRA instituted a regime of “heightened pleading requirements, limits on 
damages and attorney’s fees, a ‘safe harbor’ for certain kinds of statements, 
restrictions on the selection of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions, sanctions for 
frivolous litigation, and stays of discovery pending motions to dismiss.” Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 277 (2014). 
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2018). 
47 See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
48 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
§ 16(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3228. 
49 See Perino, supra note 28, at 915. 
50 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2009) (defining private ordering as a 
system in which “non-governmental institution[s] . . . regulate the behavior of [their] 
members”); see also Omri Yadlin, A Public Choice Approach to Private Ordering: Rent-
Seeking at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2620, 2620 (2000) 
(listing the varying definitions of private ordering). 
51 Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate 
Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 
325, 326 (2012). 
52 Bylaw, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2015). 
54 Id. § 109(b). 
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type of court—to litigate disputes.55  Advocates of these clauses 
assert that multi-jurisdictional litigation causes “[j]udicial re-
sources [to be] wasted” as the “[d]efense counsel is forced to litigate 
the same case . . . in multiple courts.”56   
Recent decisions from Delaware courts have affirmed the 
enforceability of such bylaws regulating the internal workings of 
a corporation.  First, in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund 
v. Chevron Corp.,57 the chancery court upheld board-adopted 
forum selection bylaws58 of both Chevron and FedEx.59  In each 
case, the board adopted those bylaws without shareholder 
approval.60  Then-Chancellor Strine found the challenged bylaws 
did affect the “rights” of current shareholders because they 
regulated “where stockholders can exercise their right to bring 
certain internal affairs claims.”61  The Chancery Court empha-
sized, however, that a newly promulgated bylaw must “relat[e] to 
the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its 
rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, direc-
tors, officers or employees.”62 
 
55 Forum-Selection Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
56 In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, 2011 WL 1135016, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution 
of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 333, 335 (2012) (“Forum selection clauses . . . reduce dispute resolution costs, pro-
mote efficient contracting, and enhance functional specialization in the judiciary.”).  
57 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
58 Id. at 963. The full bylaw read:  
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative 
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and 
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf 
of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary 
duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the Corporation to the 
Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a 
claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any 
interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be deemed to have 
notice of and consented to the provisions of this [bylaw]. 
Id. at 942 (alteration in original).  
59 Id. at 937. The court consolidated shareholder challenges to both Chevron’s and 
FedEx’s forum selection bylaw because the provisions had the same language. Id. at 
938. 
60 Id. at 938, 942. 
61 Id. at 951; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, Delaware Chancery Court: Forum 
Selection Bylaw Valid, D&O DIARY (June 25, 2013), https://www.dandodiary.com 
/2013/06/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/delaware-chancery-court-forum-
selection-bylaw-valid/ [https://perma.cc/J92G-W99J]. 
62 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 950. 
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Subsequently, the Delaware legislature codified the Boiler-
makers holding for forum selection clauses.  As amended, section 
115 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) states: 
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, con-
sistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or 
all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and ex-
clusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provision 
of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit 
bringing such claims in the courts of this State.  “Internal cor-
porate claims” means claims, including claims in the right of the 
corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a 
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such 
capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the 
Court of Chancery.63 
The new section authorizes forum selection clauses in the 
certificate of incorporation or bylaws that stipulate Delaware’s 
Chancery Court as the exclusive forum for “internal corporate 
claims.”64  Put simply, Delaware corporations may now require all 
claims related to the corporation’s internal affairs to be in 
Delaware state court.  Also of note, the new legislation did not 
address federal securities claims. 
Similar to Boilermakers, the Delaware Supreme Court, in 
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,65 faced the enforce-
ability of a unilaterally board-adopted fee-shifting bylaw of a non-
stock corporation in cases of unsuccessful intra-corporate litiga-
tion.66  Here, too, the Delaware Supreme Court held the bylaw was 
enforceable.67  In coming to its conclusion, the court emphasized 
 
63 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2015). 
64 See Jack B. Jacobs, New DGCL Amendments Endorse Forum Selection Clauses 
and Prohibit Fee-Shifting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 17, 2015), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/17/new-dgcl-amendments-endorse-forum-
selection-clauses-and-prohibit-fee-shifting/ [https://perma.cc/3NBA-D2RW]. 
65 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). The case had been certified to the Delaware Supreme 
Court by the Delaware Federal District Court. Id. at 555. 
66 Id. at 556. 
67 Id. at 560. Due to a public outcry in response to the decision, the Delaware 
legislature amended current law to prevent fee-shifting bylaws. See tit. 8, § 102(f) 
(“The certificate of incorporation may not contain any provision that would impose 
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any 
other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this 
title.”); see also DEL. CORP. L. COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSAL 3–4 (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/wp-content 
/uploads/sites/19/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-PAPE 
R-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf [https://perma.cc/92Y8-JKDL] (fearing that “[f]ee-[s]hifting 
[p]rovisions [w]ill [m]ake [s]tockholder [l]itigation, [e]ven if [m]eritorious, 
[u]ntenable”). 
2020] ARBITRATING SECURITY CLASS ACTIONS 855 
the fact that fee-shifting only occurred within the context of “intra-
corporate litigation.”68  In other words, the Court found the bylaw 
merely allocated risk among intra-corporate parties, which, to the 
court, tracked the mandates of title 8, section 109(b), of the 
Delaware Code.69 
Although not dealing with federal securities claims, these 
recent decisions by Delaware courts have helped clarify the 
lengths, and limits, parties can go through for private ordering.  
The courts’ holdings in ATP Tour, Inc. and Boilermakers suggest 
that boards have near-unfettered discretion when operating 
within internal affairs.70  Yet these two decisions also suggest that 
the board’s authority does not reach outside that sphere.   
Buoyed by the success of expansive bylaws regulating 
corporate internal affairs,71 opponents of shareholder class action 
claims have trained their eyes on a new frontier: arbitration72 
bylaws regulating federal securities claims.  To this point, the wis-
dom, and more importantly the enforceability, of such arbitration 
bylaws has been questioned by scholars and the SEC.73  And even 
the most ardent supporters of forum selection bylaws have recog-
 
68 ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d at 557. Later, in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, the Delaware 
Supreme Court drew a distinction between intra-corporate and internal-affairs 
claims. 227 A.3d 102, 130–31 (Del. 2020). Although not the focus of this paper, this 
decision is briefly discussed infra notes 126–152 and accompanying text.  
69 ATP Tour, Inc., 91 A.3d. at 558. 
70 In the four months immediately following the Boilermakers decision, 112 
Delaware Corporations adopted or announced plans to adopt exclusive forum bylaws. 
See Claudia H. Allen, United States: Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, MONDAQ 
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/287660/Shareholders/Trends 
+In+Exclusive+Forum+Bylaws [https://perma.cc/9JJH-R4LG].  
71 See id.; see also, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 
A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013); City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 
99 A.3d 229, 230, 242 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a bylaw selecting the federal Eastern 
District of North Carolina as the designated forum). But see Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that a forum selection bylaw unilaterally 
adopted by corporate directors is unenforceable). 
72 An arbitration clause is an agreement between contracting parties to settle 
disagreements through a “dispute-resolution process” overseen by “one or more 
neutral third parties.” Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 760 (2004) (describing arbitration as a 
“dispute-resolution process”).  
73 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; Hogan Lovells US LLP, SEC No-
Action Letter, supra note 12; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Delaware Law Status of 
Bylaws Regulating Litigation of Federal Securities Law Claims, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/29 
/delaware-law-status-of-bylaws-regulating-litigation-of-federal-securities-law-claims 
[https://perma.cc/76FP-853R]. 
856 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:845   
nized arbitration bylaws raise different enforceability questions.74  
Nonetheless, parties have proceeded with arbitration bylaw pro-
posals, such as the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust and the 
trustee of Commonwealth REIT.75  Others have backed off propos-
als after opposition from the SEC, like the proposals from both 
Gannett and Pfizer76 and one by the Carlyle Group L.P. in 2012.77 
While much of the scholarship in this area has focused on the 
preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act,78 not enough 
attention has been paid to whether such bylaws are allowed in the 
first place under state-corporate law.  Even those articles that 
have made a corporation’s internal affairs the central theme have 
only briefly discussed the doctrine’s applicability to arbitration 
clauses.79 
Yet, even absent exhaustive scholarship, the uncertainty 
demonstrated by scholars and the SEC about enforceability of 
arbitration bylaws is unsurprising as such clauses raise serious 
state law concerns.  In particular, such arbitration bylaws clash 
with traditional notions of corporate internal affairs. 
II.  THE LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE ORDERING 
IMPOSED BY THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
Arbitration bylaws seeking to cover disputes involving federal 
securities transactions do not satisfy the requirements of the 
internal affairs doctrine.  First, federal securities claims are 
unconcerned with the relationship between the corporation, 
directors, and stockholders.  Indeed, many securities transactions 
occur between a corporation and a then-third party.  Thus, such 
transactions do not implicate the internal affairs of a 
corporation.  Moreover, long-standing precedent by legislatures 
 
74 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal 
Affairs, Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1331 (2020). 
75 See supra Introduction.  
76 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
77 “[T]he SEC effectively blocked the IPO” of the Carlyle Group L.P. after the 
company had intended to include an arbitration clause for federal securities claims in 
its originating documents. Andrew Rhys Davies, Should the SEC Allow IPOs When 




78 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
79 See generally, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, The Contested Edges of Internal Affairs, 87 
TENN. L. REV. 251, 295–96 (2020). 
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and courts has sought to bifurcate claims over a corporation’s 
internal affairs and the federal securities laws. 
A. The Doctrine 
Recent decisions by Delaware courts on the reach of corpora-
tions’ governance documents rest on the internal affairs doctrine.  
The internal affairs doctrine revolves around internal corporate 
governance, usually expressed through documents such as bylaws 
and charters.80  Specifically, the doctrine is a choice of law prin-
ciple.81  This distinction between internal and external affairs 
comes from corporate governance being within the province of 
state law in the United States.82  To remedy any confusion that 
may stem from potentially fifty sets of corporate law, the internal 
affairs doctrine ensures “that only one State should have the 
authority to regulate a corporation’s . . . affairs” for the corpora-
tion to avoid “conflicting demands.”83  Thus, the state law in which 
incorporation occurred controls over disputes arising from the 
corporation’s internal affairs.84  While most states have codified 
 
80 See Henry DuPont Ridgely, The Emerging Role of Bylaws in Corporate 
Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2015); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *475–76 (“[B]y-laws or private statutes [are] for the better government of 
the corporation . . . .”). 
81 See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal 
Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 29, 44 (1987); Frederick Tung, 
Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 39 
(2006) (“In its modern form, the internal affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule, widely 
accepted among states . . . .”); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 
871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a long-standing 
choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority 
to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.”).  
82 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (describing 
corporate governance litigation as involving “private parties hav[ing] entered legal 
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed 
by state-law standards”); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) 
(“Corporations are creatures of state law . . . .” (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 
(1975))). 
83 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also Manesh, supra note 79, 
at 263−64. 
84 Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 
2110 (2018). 
858 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:845   
the internal affairs doctrine,85 some scholars and judges believe 
that the doctrine is a constitutional command.86 
To abide by this choice of law principle, a corporation’s bylaws 
must relate to “the business of the corporation[ ], the conduct of 
[its] affairs, or the rights of the stockholders.”87  Further, valid 
bylaws must be “procedural [and] process-oriented [in] nature”88 
in that they “direct how the corporation, the board, and its stock-
holders may take certain actions.”89  Put differently, the internal 
affairs doctrine distinguishes between actions by an individual or 
a corporation and actions “peculiar to the corporate entity.”90  
As a general matter, the exact reach of the doctrine remains 
an open question.91  While courts—especially Delaware courts—
have taken an expansive view of the internal affairs doctrine,92 
these outcomes have done little to establish the exact contours of 
the doctrine.  In fact, courts within the same state will often have 
conflicting holdings on the same issue concerning the reach of the 
 
85 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2015) (“The bylaws may contain 
any provision . . . relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, 
and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers 
or employees.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“The law of 
the jurisdiction of formation of a foreign corporation governs . . . the internal affairs 
of the foreign corporation . . . .”). 
86 Buxbaum, supra note 81, at 44 (claiming the internal affairs doctrine is rooted 
in the Fair Faith and Credit Clause); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 
1987) (“[W]e conclude that application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by 
constitutional principles . . . .”). But see Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, 
Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 716 (“[T]he [internal 
affairs doctrine] never has been entitled to constitutional protection . . . .”). 
87 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 951 (Del. Ch. 
2013); see also Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645–46. 
88 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 951 (quoting CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008)). 
89 Id.  
90 McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 214; accord Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 
128 (Del. 2020). 
91 See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women on 
Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition 8 (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 454/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=3384768 (“[T]he scope of the internal affairs doctrine . . . remain[s] 
somewhat unclear.”). 
92 See Manesh supra note 79, at 269; see also VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 
v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (“[T]he conflicts practice of both state 
and federal courts has consistently been to apply the law of the state of incorporation 
to ‘the entire gamut of internal corporate affairs.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting 
McDermott Inc., 531 A.2d at 216)). This capacious reading of the internal affairs 
doctrine by Delaware courts should come as no surprise because, considering that the 
majority of corporations incorporate in Delaware, such rulings enlarge the power of 
its state courts. See Manesh supra note 79, at 269. 
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internal affairs doctrine.93  Given this uncertainty, the recent deci-
sions from Delaware Courts94 help clarify the doctrine. 
B. Internal Affairs and Federal Securities Transactions  
Past practices of legislatures and courts of separating internal 
corporate matters and federal securities laws clash with the legal 
scheme envisioned by advocates of arbitration bylaws.  In fact, the 
bifurcation of securities transactions and corporate internal af-
fairs dates back to some of the oldest cases in this field.95  Congress 
has also supported the division of federal and state law concerning 
corporations.  Recognizing the long-standing principle of avoiding 
the overlap between federal securities law and state corporate law, 
Congress added a “savings clause”—known as the “Delaware 
carve-out”96—to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (“SLUSA”)97 to “preserve[ ] certain types of state-law 
claims that would otherwise be subject to its preclusion pro-
vision.”98  To that end, SLUSA’s legislative history buttresses the 
claim that Congress was concerned with avoiding overlap.99   
 
93 Compare Miesse v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 264 A.D. 373, 374 (1st Dep’t 1942) 
(finding a dispute over redeeming preferred stock under the corporation’s internal 
affairs), with Borst v. E. Coast Shipyards, 105 N.Y.S.2d 228, 231–32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1951) (holding the plaintiff’s claim to redeem preferred stock was not a matter 
under the internal affairs doctrine).  
94 See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text.  
95 See, e.g., Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U.S. 157, 165 (1902) (“[W]hen a corporation 
sells or encumbers its property, incurs debts or gives securities, it does business, and 
a statute regulating such transactions does not regulate the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”). 
96 Kenneth Hsu, The Delaware Carve-Out’s Carve: Examining and Repairing 
SLUSA’s State Law Exception, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 385, 387 (2015). 
97 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227. Congress has also sought to create corporate carve outs in other areas of 
the law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (2018) (exempting certain internal affairs 
claims from the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
98 Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Malone v. 
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998) (“The 1998 Act, however, contains two important 
exceptions . . . . These exceptions have become known as the ‘Delaware carve-outs.’ ”). 
99 The Senate Committee Report on SLUSA states, in part: 
The Committee is keenly aware of the importance of state corporate law, 
specifically those states that have laws that establish a fiduciary duty of 
disclosure. It is not the intent of the Committee in adopting this legislation 
to interfere with state law regarding the duties and performance of an 
issuer’s directors or officers in connection with a purchase or sale of 
securities by the issuer or an affiliate from current shareholders or 
communicating with existing shareholders with respect to voting their 
shares, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising 
dissenters’ or appraisal rights. 
S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (1998). 
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Courts, too, have been wary of allowing the legal scheme 
advanced by arbitration bylaw advocates.  In particular, the Su-
preme Court has explicitly rejected attempts to “federalize”100 
causes of action dealing with a corporation’s internal workings.  
For instance, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Court 
refused to adopt a “ ‘federal fiduciary principle’ under Rule 
10b-5.”101  In coming to its holding, the Court relied on congres-
sional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act, which “did 
not seek to regulate transactions which constitute[d] . . . internal 
corporate mismanagement.”102  Instead, the 1934 Act sought to 
regulate transactions between outside third parties.103   
Yet more problematic for advocates of arbitration bylaws is 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which 
struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act as an impermis-
sible burden on interstate commerce.104  The Illinois Act, applying 
to issuers of securities “of which shareholders located in Illinois 
own 10%,” regulated tender offers.105   
In rejecting the argument that the Illinois statute regulated 
internal affairs, Justice White, writing for the Court, defined 
tender offers as “transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party 
[that] do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target 
company.”106  Under this definition, the court found that tender 
offers involve a then-third party and that they thus have no 
bearing on the internal rights of the transacting corporation.107   
 
100 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear 
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial 
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, 
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be 
overridden.”); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(finding the newly promulgated SEC rule requiring corporations to abide by one 
share/one vote principles to be a federal intrusion into a “major issue[ ] traditionally 
governed by state law”). 
101 Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479. 
102 Id. (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 
(1971)).  
103 Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12. 
104 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982). 
105 Id. at 627.  
106 Id. at 645.  
107 Id. As with securities transactions generally, the buyer—in this case the 
tender offeror—may already own other shares of the company, but that is irrelevant 
to the role it occupies as to the transaction at issue. Federal Securities laws apply 
equally to current-shareholders and non-shareholders alike. Further, these laws are 
only concerned with the effect of potential violations of its provisions on an investor 
acting in that role as to that particular transaction. Any other relationship to the 
company, as to the transaction, is irrelevant. 
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With this precedential background from the Supreme Court, 
and recent holdings from Delaware Courts, it is hard to imagine a 
scenario where arbitration bylaws seeking to cover federal 
securities transactions would fall within the internal affairs of a 
corporation.  If tender offers do not regulate a corporation’s inter-
nal affairs, how do standard market transactions affect internal 
affairs?  To that end, as the Chancery Court stated in 
Sciabacucchi, “the purchaser is not yet a stockholder and does not 
yet have any relationship with the corporation that is governed by 
Delaware corporate law.”108  While the purchaser of stock will 
eventually become associated with the interplay of the rights and 
powers between the corporation, directors, and stockholders, at 
the time of purchase he or she is an outside third party.  No 
amount of clever argumentation can explain away the inclusion of 
a then-third party under a doctrine that only touches matters 
“peculiar to [the] corporation[ ].”109 
What is more, federal securities claims implicate different 
rights than those under a corporation’s internal affairs.110   
A corporation is brought into existence by the state as a sovereign 
power, which governs the corporation through the state’s operative 
law.111  Through this process, state law reigns over the internal 
determinations of the corporation.112  By contrast, federal securi-
ties transactions derive from federal law meant to regulate the 
purchase and sale of securities.  A securities claim thus implicates 
a violation of federal law at most incidental to the internal 
workings of a corporation.  Simply put, the state-based rights of 
the internal affairs doctrine are unconcerned whether parties 
follow federal law. 
Indeed, federal securities transactions conflict with the long-
held understanding by Delaware Courts of a corporation’s internal 
affairs.  Federal securities transactions do not “pertain to the rela-
tionships among or between the corporation and its officers, 
 
108 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931, 2018 WL 6719718, at *17 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 19, 2018), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
109 QVT Fund LP v. Eurohypo Cap. Funding LLC I, No. 5881, 2011 WL 2672092, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2011) (quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 
1987)). 
110 See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 79, 80 (2005) (“The federal securities laws generally have been considered 
full disclosure statutes, as opposed to merit regulation statutes or laws governing the 
internal affairs of corporations.”). 
111 See Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *18. 
112 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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directors, and shareholders.”113  As securities transactions occur by 
an outside, third party, the transaction is not “among or between” 
the internal affair’s stakeholders.114  While engaging in securities 
transactions are acts corporations participate in, courts must 
exclude from the internal affairs doctrine “acts which can be 
performed by both corporations and individuals.”115  That is why 
the internal affairs doctrine “does not extend to claims ‘where the 
rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue.’ ”116 
Other claims that do fall within a corporation’s internal 
affairs are illustrative of the disconnect between such a claim and 
federal securities transactions.  For instance, the internal affairs 
doctrine implicates disputes over whether a contract binds a 
corporation created in a “spin-off transaction” that the former 
parent company engaged in with its former stockholder.117  Putting 
aside the more esoteric contract questions, the issue for the 
stockholders involved the internal affairs doctrine because the 
relevant terms of the agreement pertained to the rights of 
stockholders with the corporation.  Unlike the position of the buyer 
in many securities transactions, the plaintiffs here were stock-
holders at the time the deal was struck.  Nor is a dispute over a 
contractual “put right”118 clause, that gave the plaintiff the au-
thority to dissolve the company, outside the reach of the internal 
affairs doctrine.119  Dissimilar to a federal securities claim, which 
stems from federal law, the ability to dissolve a company directly 
 
113 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 
(Del. 2005). 
114 See Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P’ship, 140 A.3d 1125, 1140 (Del. 2016) (holding 
that a defendant’s misstatement about a stock trade resulted in a “personal” claim 
that was not “governed by the internal affairs doctrine”); see also In re Ebix, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2014 WL 3696655, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014) 
(explaining that “this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction” over 
“issue[s] . . . governed by the federal securities laws”).  
115 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 (Del. 1987). 
116 Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 291 (Del. Ch.) (quoting 
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 871 A.2d at 1113 n.14), aff’d, 126 A.3d 1115 
(Del. 2015). 
117 See Miramar Police Officers’ Ret. Plan v. Murdoch, No. 9860, 2015 WL 
1593745, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 7, 2015).  
118 JOHN B. LYNCH, JR. & TAYLOR A. SHEA, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ORGANIZING A 
BUSINESS IN CONNECTICUT § 7.8.2 (“A put right gives a stakeholder the right to force 
the company and/or other stakeholders (in proportion to their ownership interests) to 
purchase from it all of its interest in the company under certain specified 
circumstances.”). 
119 See Terramar Retail Ctrs., LLC v. Marion #2-Seaport Tr., No. 12875, 2017 WL 
3575712, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017), aff’d, 184 A.3d 1290 (Del. 2018). 
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implicates the rights derived from one’s legal relationship with the 
company. 
Proponents of a broad reading of the internal affairs doctrine 
proffer that securities laws are “clearly internal” because of the 
internal nature of board decisions that give rise to the securities 
claim.120  But such a view misreads the internal affairs doctrine—
especially after Boilermakers and ATP Tour, Inc.—and would lead 
to confusing results.  Indeed, such an everything-between-the-
shareholders-and-company-is-internal-affairs approach has no 
logical end.  What happens if a director, furious at a stockholder 
over a recent proxy vote, assaulted the stockholder on the 
company’s premises?  This example involves the directors, com-
pany, and stockholders but does not fall within the internal affairs 
doctrine. 
But more problematic for this reading of the internal affairs 
doctrine is that myriad claims once excluded from a corporation’s 
internal affairs would now find such a home.  For instance, credi-
tors of an insolvent corporation, seeking to bring the suit under 
Delaware law, could now justifiably make such a claim.121  
Likewise, claims against aiders and abettors of a director’s breach 
of fiduciary duty in a merger could be under the corporation’s 
internal affairs.122  In fact, the latter example parallels federal 
securities claims because both involve the purchase of a 
corporation’s shares.  Put succinctly, these claims are not predi-
cated on the relationship between stockholders, directors, and the 
corporation, as required by the internal affairs doctrine,123 but 
rather on relationships of outsiders to these three stakeholders. 
It is against this traditional legal backdrop, with the require-
ment that a corporation’s bylaws or charter provisions involve 
issues that touch upon a relationship peculiar to the stockholders, 
directors, and the corporation, in which most state laws are 
passed.124  Indeed, the Delaware legislature recently codified the 
 
120 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 74, at 1364.  
121 Cf. Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 670–71 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding claims by 
a trustee of an insolvent corporation against creditors for improper transfer of 
corporate funds were not a matter under the corporation’s internal affairs so Texas 
law, rather than Delaware law, governed). 
122 Cf. Dominion Energy, Inc. v. City of Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 928 F.3d 
325, 337 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding claims by former shareholders of a merged 
corporation against the directors of the acquirer corporation for aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty were outside the corporation’s internal affairs).  
123 See supra notes 80–109 and accompanying text. 
124 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2,207(c) (West 2017) (“The Nebraska 
Model Business Corporation Act does not authorize this state to regulate the 
864 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:845   
Boilermakers’s decision, thus solidifying the rule that corporations 
may not enact forum selection clauses that govern external 
claims.125  It was for these reasons that the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s holding in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, overturning the 
Chancery Court,126 was so puzzling.   
The Delaware Chancery had invalidated forum selection 
clauses in three companies’ initial public offerings127 that required 
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 to be filed in federal 
court.128  In reversing the Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Su-
preme Court held that, while not within a corporation’s internal 
affairs,129 federal securities laws are within “intra-corporate” 









organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact 
business in this state.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-604 cmt. 2 (West 2012) (“This Act’s 
applicability to UNAs formed in other jurisdictions that are operating in this state is 
necessary because in all other types of entities the internal affairs rules of the 
jurisdiction of the entity’s formation (e.g., the governance rules and duties and 
responsibilities of the owners and managers to each other and the entity) 
control . . . .”).  
125 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
126 227 A.3d 102, 109 (Del. 2020). 
127 The three companies were Blue Apron, Stitch Fix, and Roku. See Kevin M. 
LaCroix, Delaware Court Holds Charter Provision Designating a Federal Forum for 
Section 11 Claims Is Invalid, D&O DIARY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.dandodiary 
.com/2018/12/articles/securities-litigation/delaware-court-holds-charter-provision-
designating-federal-forum-section-11-claims-invalid/ [https://perma.cc/WE4B-MC7T]. 
Roku’s and Stitch Fix’s forum selection provision reads:  
Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection of an alternative 
forum, the federal district courts of the United States of America shall be the 
exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting a cause of 
action arising under the Securities Act of 1933. Any person or entity 
purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in any security of the 
Corporation shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to [this 
provision].  
Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931, 2018 WL 6719718, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 
2018) (alteration in the original), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
128 Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *1. 
129 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 123 (“[N]ot even Appellants are contending that Section 
11 claims are ‘internal affairs’ claims . . . .”). 
130 Id. at 125. 
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between a corporation’s internal and external affairs.131  And title 
8, section 102(b)(1), of the Delaware Code, which does not mention 
internal affairs, authorized purportedly intra-corporate actions.132 
This dichotomy between internal and intra-corporate affairs 
is novel, however.133  Oddly enough, in the court’s attempt to define 
“intra-corporate affairs,” it cited cases that used “intracorporate” 
and “internal” disputes interchangeably as well as scholarly work 
on the definition of the internal affairs doctrine.134  Nevertheless, 
the Delaware Supreme Court, in essence, adopted the position 
offered by the petitioner at oral argument: “If the legislatures 
wanted to say internal affairs, they knew how to say it.”135   
 
131 To illustrate the point, the court created a Venn diagram:  
 
Id. at 131 fig.1. 
132 Id. at 131. Of note for this paper, the Delaware Supreme Court found that 
Delaware law forbids corporations from including mandatory arbitration provisions 
in their certificate of incorporation or bylaws under the plain language of title 8, 
section 115, of the Delaware Code. Id. at 137 n.169.  
133 While addressing the topics briefly, this paper does not take a deep dive into 
Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi or this new intra-corporate affairs theory.  
134 See, e.g., Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 128 (quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 
206, 216 (Del. 1987) (internal citation omitted)); id. at 125 n.99 (citing Manesh, supra 
note 79, at 297–98); see also Ann Lipton, So the Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi Decision Is 
In!, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 21, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business 
_law/2020/03/so-the-salzberg-v-sciabacucchi-decision-is-in.html [https://perma.cc/H5FR-
WHKS] (making the same point). 
135 Oral Argument at 11:45, Salzberg, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019), 
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/8952021/videos/200564724/player.  
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Yet this argument turns accepted principles of statutory 
interpretation on their head.  While the Delaware Supreme Court 
claimed its only job was to “construe the plain language of the 
statute,”136 no other federal or state court has adopted the position 
that laws are passed “upon a clean slate.”137  Instead, legislatures 
are understood to pass laws “against a background” of “common-
law principle[s],”138 which informs the statutory language.  For in-
stance, courts have held that congress writes bankruptcy laws in 
the context of the “pre-Code rule[s],”139 that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence are drafted with the “prevailing common-law rule[s]” in 
mind,140 and that criminal laws are passed against the backdrop of 
“the deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion . . . .”141   
Under this framework, accepted by numerous different fields 
of law, the Delaware legislature would be expected to make a clear 
statement if it wished not to be bound by the internal affairs 
doctrine.142  Otherwise, it should be presumed that the legislature 
was acting within the “hundred years”143 old guidelines of this 
doctrine.144  In fact, then-Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Boiler-
 
136 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 125. 
137 Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 435 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
138 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); accord 
Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Roth-Steffen, 778 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010); Scott v. Mattingly, 488 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Neb. 1992); cf. Note, The Internal 
Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its 
Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1482 (2002) (describing the internal 
affairs doctrine as “customary common law”); Oral Argument at 21:27, Salzberg, 227 
A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019), https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events 
/8952021/videos/200564724/player (acknowledging that the internal affairs doctrine 
is “a part of [Delaware’s] common law”). 
139 E.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). 
140 E.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995). 
141 E.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005) (Scalia, J.). 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is noteworthy because even he, a leader in the move to 
enshrine “textualism” as the primary statutory-interpretive tool of the judiciary, see 
Paul Clement, Arguing Before Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/opinion/arguing-before-justice-scalia.html [https:// 
perma.cc/EHZ6-VPFD], never claimed that the text of the statute was the only 
acceptable consideration for the court. 
142 Cf. Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 125 (Del. 2020) (“If our General Assembly wishes to 
narrow the scope of Section 102(b)(1) to be aligned perfectly with the boundaries of 
the internal affairs doctrine, it could do so.”).  
143 Oral Argument at 21:17, Salzberg, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020) (No. 346,2019), 
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/8952021/videos/200564724/player. 
144 Cf. Hamilton v. United Laundries Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 78, 80 (N.J. Ch. 1932) 
(explaining that it “is almost too obvious for remark that [the state of New Jersey] 
cannot regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations” (quoting Gregory v. N.Y., 
Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co., 40 N.J. Eq. 38, 44 (N.J. Ch. 1885))). The Delaware Supreme 
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makers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.145  appeared 
to proceed under this framework.  This is because although Dela-
ware’s statute for bylaws, title 8, section 109(b), of the Delaware 
Code, did not explicitly mention a corporation’s internal affairs,146 
the opinion still explained how bylaws regulating “external mat-
ters” would be unenforceable.147 
At bottom, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision has created 
“uncertain challenges”148 for corporate law moving forward.   
Is there, for instance, a different analysis for Section 11 claims and 
those under 10b-5?149  And how will Salzberg impact decisions by 
other states’ highest courts on the limits of their corporate law,150 
as other states “often look[ ] to Delaware’s rich abundance of cor-
porate law for guidance”?151  Based on the preceding sections, these 
state courts should try to stay in their “lane[s]” by maintaining the 
traditional limits on corporate authority that were universally 
 
Court made much of the fact that the Delaware legislature explicitly mentions 
“internal affairs” in other statutes, see Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 117–19, but it is unclear 
why that changed the analysis. There is no support for the proposition that a 
legislature explicitly mentioning a common-law principle in the text of a statute 
vitiates for the remaining laws within the jurisdiction the accepted statutory 
interpretive rule that laws are passed against the backdrop of common-law principles. 
145 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
146 It instead constrained a corporation’s bylaws to “the business of the cor-
poration, the conduct of its affairs, and . . . the rights or powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8 § 109(b) (West 2015)); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(1) (West 2018) (“Any 
provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the 
corporation, and . . . regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the 
stockholders, or any class of the stockholders, or the governing body, members, or any 
class or group of members of a nonstock corporation . . . .”).  
147 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 952. 
148 Jeff Montgomery, Del. Federal Forum Ruling Could Open Door to Mischief, 
LAW360 (Mar. 19, 2020, 11:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/securities/articles 
/1255189/del-federal-forum-ruling-could-open-door-to-mischief [https://perma.cc/JSX9-
RMJA] (quoting Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh); see Lipton, supra note 134.  
149 See Lipton, supra note 134; cf. Seafarers Pension Plan ex rel. Boeing Co. v. 
Bradway, No. 19 C 8095, 2020 WL 3246326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2020) (opining that 
Salzberg’s analysis is not controlling in cases concerning the enforceability of forum 
selection clauses regulating claims under the “1934 Act”). 
150 See generally, e.g., Ann Lipton, The United States of Delaware, BUS. L. PROF 
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/08/the-
united-states-of-delaware.html [https://perma.cc/YN8W-4SAH] (discussing the con-
flicting Delaware and California law concerning shareholder inspection rights). 
151 IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assocs., 136 F.3d 940, 949–50 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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accepted before Salzberg.152  This approach has allowed for the law 
to grow against a predictable legal landscape. 
CONCLUSION 
Arbitration bylaws regulating federal securities claims are 
unenforceable.  A corporation’s internal affairs do not include 
securities claims because such claims do not turn on the rights 
between the corporation, directors, and current stockholders. 
Considering the purpose of securities shareholder suits—
mainly holding directors accountable—this is a just result.  It 
would make little sense, given this national purpose, to shuttle 
federal securities claims off to arbitration forums.  Such a scheme 
will lead to the deterioration of a developing national standard 
protecting against fraudulent securities conduct. 
 
 
152 Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 503, 506–07 (2008). 
